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Introduction 
This paper investigates Charles Peirce’s pragmatism, especially as it relates to 
questions of how we should conduct scientific inquiry. Peirce argues that the scientific 
method is the best method of inquiry, at least in part because it takes reality as its object. 
His system also suggests that conformity with reality is best pursued through maximal 
resistance, which makes the optimal path for inquiry the path of greatest resistance. 
Limited resources mean that we cannot always pursue researches optimally, however. As a 
working scientist, Peirce was well aware of such limitations and recognized that economy 
in research involves some analysis of what it will cost to gather evidence and how that 
balances against the likely benefits of that research activity. Pursuing research 
economically, then, requires that one have some guidelines for gathering evidence in a way 
that will maximize production of knowledge. I argue that Peirce’s own recommendations 
can be, and given his broader commitments should be, understood in terms of maximizing 
opposition. 
1. Inquiry According to Peirce 
For this discussion, two aspects of Peirce’s account of inquiry are of particular 
importance. First is Peirce’s insistence that inquiry always begins with a set of beliefs in 
hand. Second is that Peirce’s model of inquiry relies fundamentally on the operation of 
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doubt. In particular doubt is necessary for both prompting and sustaining inquiry. These 
aspects of Peirce’s account are considered in some detail below. 
According to Peirce, belief just is a habit of sorts; beliefs are manifest in us as 
propensities to act. In “The Fixation of Belief” he states, “Our beliefs guide our desires and 
shape our actions. . . . Belief does not make us act at once, but puts us into such a condition 
that we shall behave in some certain way, when the occasion arises” (5.371-373).1 The 
propensity to act in a particular way under particular circumstances is indicative of habit. 
The nature of the habit characteristic of belief is clarified in the passage below: 
Belief is not a momentary mode of consciousness; it is a habit of mind 
essentially enduring for some time, and mostly (at least) unconscious; and 
like other habits, it is (until it meets with some surprise that begins its 
dissolution) perfectly self-satisfied. Doubt is of an altogether contrary 
genus. It is not a habit, but the privation of a habit. (5.417) 
Beliefs, on Peirce’s account, are dispositional not propositional, and the set of habits that 
constitutes one’s belief system will continue unaltered unless and until it “meets with some 
surprise”. Once something happens to challenge one’s belief set, one may be thrown into 
doubt.2 
Peirce concerned himself with what he termed ‘genuine’ doubt. He writes: “[T]he 
mere putting of a proposition into the interrogative form does not stimulate the mind to any 
struggle after belief. There must be a real and living doubt, and without this all discussion 
is idle” (5.376). To say that one recognizes a proposition to be dubitable is not the same as 
to doubt the proposition. Manufactured doubt, or doubt that is simply a matter of 
entertaining alternatives, Peirce thought useful for examining consequences and such, but 
it is not the sort of impetus to inquiry as is genuine doubt. He states “doubt has a limen, 
                                                 
1 References of this form (n.m), are to volume n and paragraph m of Peirce’s Collected Papers. 
2 This is to be explored more deeply in what follows, especially with respect to the precise sort of 
relationship that exists between belief and doubt. 
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that is, is only called into being by a certain finite stimulus” (5.416).3 Typically Peirce 
speaks of such stimuli as surprising, or recalcitrant experiences. Once some surprising 
stimulus presents itself, it is then possible for one to be thrown into a state of doubt. This 
state is sufficiently uncomfortable as to promote action of some sort. So, in “The Fixation 
of Belief,” Peirce states: “The irritation of doubt causes a struggle to attain a state of belief. 
I shall term this struggle inquiry…” (5.374). He acknowledges, of course, that this use of 
the term ‘inquiry’ may be non-standard. ‘Inquiry’, in Peirce’s sense, applies more broadly 
than the word in its usual sense and is defined by reference to its goal. 
According to Peirce, the sole object of inquiry is the settlement of belief. If one’s 
beliefs are already settled—that is, if one’s beliefs have not been unsettled by doubt—then 
inquiry will not begin. Doubt is the promoter of inquiry and only occurs with the 
presentation of some surprising stimulus. But, surprise just is a thwarting of expectations, 
and having expectations requires that one have some beliefs about what is to be expected. 
Thus, inquiry cannot begin from a state absent of belief. Potential inquirers always begin 
with some set of beliefs already in hand.4 Included in this set are beliefs about what will 
count as relevant evidence, whose accounts are to be believed, how to tell when a 
hypothesis has been confirmed or defeated, etc. Any of one’s beliefs (or some combination 
of these) may be susceptible to doubt, but none is scrutinized until some positive reason for 
doing so has presented itself. On Peirce’s view, doubt arises only where one encounters 
some stimulus that poses a challenge to one’s set of beliefs. When one’s belief system is 
                                                 
3 See also 5.374-5. 
4 This discussion leaves aside the question of from where beliefs come initially – though a thorough study of 
Peirce’s evolutionary cosmology would go some way to illuminating Peirce’s stance on this issue. For such a 
study, see (Kronz and McLaughlin 2002). Peirce himself took up this issue, though his treatment has not 
thoroughly satisfied his critics. See, for example, (Scheffler 1974, 66-67). It is enough for the present 
purposes that we incontrovertibly do have beliefs and that they may be consistently treated in the way that 
Peirce treats them. The issue of whether Peirce’s account of belief origination could be made satisfactory is 
left for future exploration. 
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challenged, this may be sufficiently irritating to motivate one to inquiry – the sole purpose 
of which is to remove the irritation of doubt by settling on some suitable, perhaps revised, 
set of beliefs. 
Doubt’s abatement occurs when satisfactory beliefs are established, that is when 
one’s belief set is settled. Peirce says, “Doubt … stimulates us to inquiry until it [doubt] is 
destroyed” (5.373). Once doubt is destroyed, inquiry is bereft of its prompt and thus we are 
left in the comfort and stability of that habit of mind known as belief – that is, unless and 
until some further challenge initiates the process of inquiry anew. 
For Peirce, the only aim of inquiry is to settle belief, and the path that inquiry takes 
is determined by the method that one uses to achieve this aim. The key question at this 
point is how to decide which methods to use. Under Peirce’s system, the criterion for 
judging a method of inquiry must be how well the method is suited to the goal of inquiry. 
Misak notes that, since “[Peirce] holds that the aim of inquiry is settlement of belief, he is 
right to insist that he can appeal only to efficiency in that regard to judge methods of 
inquiry” (1991, 56-57). The following discussion of Peirce’s theory of inquiry focuses on 
Misak’s reformed Peircean account, which attempts to address a significant criticism of 
Peirce’s explicit account. The criticism she raises deserves to be taken seriously, more 
seriously, I suggest, than even she herself takes it. 
2. Peirce on Methods of Inquiry 
Peirce’s strategy in arguing against specious methods is to show that the possibility 
will always remain that beliefs acquired through these methods become subject to doubt. 
Methods of inquiry that fix belief according to something potentially unstable cannot, 
according to Peirce, succeed in the long run. Primarily, this is because of the possibility 
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that inquirers will recognize the potential instability, and that recognition alone will suffice 
to give rise to doubt.5 The only method of inquiry that successfully safeguards against the 
emergence of doubt is the scientific method, according to Peirce.6 The scientific method 
has corrective mechanisms built-in – it is sensitive to empirical and practical 
considerations. This method will not succumb in the same degree to the vagaries of 
individual opinion; the reason for this is science’s aim at external reality. The fundamental 
hypothesis of science, as Peirce construes it, is that “[t]here are Real things, whose 
characters are entirely independent of our opinions about them” (5.384). Thus, the beliefs 
settled by the scientific method are supposed to be determined (at least in part) “by some 
external permanency – by something upon which our thinking has no effect” (5.384). So, 
while the scientific method does not necessarily result in permanently fixed belief, that is, 
belief that would never be subject to doubt, it does include safeguards against the 
inevitability of doubt’s resurgence. The very nature of the method results in beliefs that are 
least susceptible to future doubt. 
It is critical for Peirce to have a clear and appropriate account of which methods of 
inquiry to use, since his account of truth relies heavily on his account of inquiry. 
According to Peirce, one would arrive at the truth about any particular matter if one were 
to inquire far enough into the matter. Thus the truth about a matter is whatever opinion 
would be the final opinion, resulting from inquiry carried sufficiently far.7 However, 
Peirce’s fallibilism precludes his accepting that we can ever know for certain whether any 
                                                 
5 This is, of course, only a very cursory treatment of Peirce’s arguments against specious methods of inquiry, 
which for present purposes suffices. Much has been written on this subject, and I refer the interested reader to 
other sources for more detailed treatments of Peirce’s theory of inquiry; see (Hookway 2000), (Levi 1991), 
(Misak 1991), (Short 2000), (Skagestad 1981). 
6 In his “The Logic of 1873” Peirce refers to this method as “investigation” and “reasoning.” 
7 See, for example, 2.693, 5.408, 8.43, more obliquely 4.62 and 7.336. The reasonableness of this account of 
truth is not discussed here; the account is mentioned only to showcase the role that inquiry plays in Peirce’s 
system. 
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particular belief is true or not. Truth, then, on his account, serves primarily as a regulative 
ideal; its primary function is to motivate inquiry. So, it is critical that we know which 
avenues of inquiry are legitimate and which to avoid. 
3. Misak’s Challenge 
Misak agrees with Peirce’s assessment of the methods. That is, she agrees that the 
methods Peirce claims to be specious are so. Misak takes issue, though, with Peirce’s 
arguments for this claim. She claims that the arguments rely on an empirical, psychological 
fact about inquirers – that they will be influenced by opinions other than their own. If it 
were possible to safeguard against all opposing influence, (via, e.g., a “belief-freezing” 
pill), then whatever the method, it would satisfy Peirce’s requirements for permanently 
fixing belief. The fact that any such safeguards might be built into an obviously specious 
method seriously undermines Peirce’s argument. We turn now to Misak’s arguments to 
this effect. 
The first vulnerability Misak detects in Peirce’s arguments against the three 
specious methods is that the arguments are based on a supposed psychological fact about 
inquirers – that when we encounter beliefs that differ from our own we will be prompted to 
examine our beliefs and perhaps to doubt them. The presumption that one is likely to take 
seriously the claims of others is plausible “because inquirers are members of a community, 
they utilize the results of other members” (Misak 1991, 58). This interdependence is so 
widespread, in fact, that Peirce claims: “[O]ne man’s experience is nothing, if it stands 
alone. If he sees what others cannot, we call it hallucination” (5.402 n.2).8 According to 
Misak, though, this will not suffice since judgments about competence are made with 
                                                 
8 See also 7.644. 
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respect to background beliefs. These beliefs will determine the relevant members of the 
community to whom attention should be paid. If it is implicit in the background beliefs that 
people who do not share belief X should not be listened to, where X is a first principle for 
example, the a priori method might safeguard against the emergence of doubt perfectly 
well. Thus, there may be opinions that are (more or less) permanently settled that were 
derived from methods Peirce explicitly rejects. Misak also points out that what counts as 
competence in science is not particularly well resolved. The fact that there are 
controversies in science, and that scientists do not unanimously accept results shows that 
even the scientific method can be subject to differences of opinion. Misak, though, finds 
material enough in Peirce’s works to muster an alternative, and she thinks better, argument 
against specious methods. 
It seems, from what has been said so far, that Peirce’s account is as follows: 
Whatever is true is what would be accepted at the end of all possible inquiry. Inquiry just 
is the process of settling belief. So, those methods of inquiry that best fix a hypothesis in 
one’s mind are the methods that will be best for arriving at the truth. Misak attempts to 
refine somewhat this naïve notion of inquiry. She claims that inquiry is not intended to fix 
hypotheses or habits simply; its intended result is the fixation of a habit that satisfies the 
requirements for being genuine belief. A hypothesis or disposition is a genuine belief, 
according to Misak, when it is sensitive and responsive to evidence (1991, 59). Otherwise, 
it is some tenacious psychological state, but not a belief. Peirce’s account of truth, as 
Misak construes it, requires not that inquiry make hypotheses doubt-resistant but that it fix 
genuine beliefs – which are hypotheses that were gathered in ways that respond to 
evidence and that are themselves sensitive to evidence. Misak concludes as follows: 
 
 
McLaughlin – In Pursuit of Resistance  (DRAFT – Please do not cite or quote) 
 
 
8
So, given that a belief, in order to be a belief, must be sensitive to 
evidence for and against it, the aim of inquiry, on Peirce’s account, is to 
get beliefs which are not merely fixed, but which are fixed in such a way 
that they fit with and respond to the evidence. (1991, 60) 
This criterion for genuine belief, Misak claims, overcomes the shortcomings of Peirce’s 
explicit arguments and provides an appropriate measure for evaluating methods of inquiry. 
4. Objection to Misak’s Account 
Misak’s analysis is weighted heavily on the notion of evidence. On her account, 
legitimate methods are the ones that produce genuine belief, and the criterion for genuine 
belief is that it be sensitive to evidence. Defining genuine belief in terms of sensitivity to 
evidence requires that one give some suitable characterization of what is to count as 
evidence. Such characterizations, however, are notoriously difficult; entire treatises have 
been written in attempt to suitably characterize what should count as evidence.9 Thus, 
Misak’s account is programmatic at best – without a precise account of what is to count as 
evidence, Misak’s refinement is of little use. 
One might think that Misak could easily dismiss the charge that she gives 
insufficient attention to defining evidence. Although the definition of genuine belief does 
involve reference to evidence-sensitivity, there is (she might claim) nothing in particular 
that is required about evidence in order for something to be sensitive to it. She might 
argue, for instance, that whatever the actual inquirer would count as evidence will suffice; 
and the same criterion need not be applied among different inquirers (or even among 
different inquiries by the same inquirer). What is crucial is that the belief achieved at the 
end of the process is in fact sensitive to evidence of some sort. Furthermore, being 
                                                 
9 See for example: (Achinstein 2001), (Glymour 1980), (Horwich 1982). 
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sensitive to evidence does not require that a belief be actually revised in light of whatever 
evidence comes along. No precise criterion for telling which evidence to take seriously 
need apply in the context of conducting inquiry. Thus, Misak might argue, no 
characterization of what is to count as evidence is necessary for determining what methods 
of inquiry are legitimate. 
On Misak’s account, one decides whether a method is a legitimate method of 
inquiry by testing to see whether it produces genuine belief. Testing for production of 
genuine belief might be done in one of two possible ways. Either one tests the result of the 
inquiry (the hypothesis or disposition formed as a result of the inquiry) to determine 
whether it is sensitive to evidence, or one tests the method to see whether in its production 
of the hypothesis or disposition the method takes account of evidence. In each case, one 
must consider what appropriately counts as evidence in order to determine which methods 
of inquiry are legitimate. Appealing to evidence as determinant to any degree of a 
method’s legitimacy requires reference to an independent evidence-criterion. Without such 
a criterion in hand, anything one is willing to count as evidence suffices and consequently 
any method can count as legitimate. That is, Misak’s account succumbs to the same 
objection she levels against Peirce. Criteria of evidence, just as much as criteria of 
competence, are determined according to background beliefs. Thus, any method could be 
made legitimate by appeal to suitable evidence criteria. Bereft of an independent criterion 
for determining what should count as evidence, Misak’s account does not clarify but rather 
seems to muddy the waters. 
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5. The “Open Path” Alternative 
There is a relatively straightforward way of understanding Peirce’s view that will 
resolve which methods of inquiry are to be deemed legitimate and which are not. Peirce 
defines a method of inquiry as aimed at fixing or settling belief. Also, inquiry begins, on 
Peirce’s account, at the onset of doubt—defined as the absence of a fixed belief—and ends 
when one’s beliefs are fixed. So, whatever can successfully remove doubt will be termed, 
on Peirce’s account, a method of inquiry. Removal of doubt, however, clearly does not 
suffice to legitimate a method of inquiry. Peirce repeatedly refers to what he calls a 
“maxim” never to be infringed. This maxim is: “Do not block the way of inquiry” 
(1.135).10 Following Peirce’s dictum, I propose that we consider legitimate those methods 
of inquiry that are capable of removing doubt without blocking the path of further inquiry. 
Thus, every legitimate method of inquiry will have two components: it will (1) settle belief 
by removing doubt, and (2) leave open the path to future inquiry into the matter. Here is 
where an explicitly normative element enters into the Peircean account, requiring that one 
settle one’s beliefs about the matter, but do so in a way that leaves open the path to future 
inquiry. All of the methods that we would want to reject as obviously specious can be 
shown to fail legitimacy on this account. 
Any methods by which beliefs are fixed according to pre-existing opinions are, 
according to the criterion mentioned above, clearly illegitimate. That is, they cannot 
successfully remove doubt and leave open the possibility of future inquiry, since they 
expressly take some beliefs to be fixed and so explicitly treated as closed to inquiry. The 
method of science, broadly understood, succeeds because science is treated as “self-
                                                 
10 See also 1.156, 1.170, 1.175, 6.273, 8.243. 
 
 
McLaughlin – In Pursuit of Resistance  (DRAFT – Please do not cite or quote) 
 
 
11
criticizing, self-controlling and self-controlled, and therefore open to incessant question” 
(7.77). 
There is one method considered by Misak that passes Peirce’s legitimacy test 
(according to her construal of it) but is clearly to be counted among the illegitimate. Misak 
considers the possibility of making a ‘belief-freezing’ pill – a pill that one could take to 
permanently fix all beliefs in one’s mind. Strangely enough, the belief-freezing pill method 
(given Peirce’s account) counts as a method of inquiry; it does in fact settle belief, and it 
does so permanently. If one’s state of mind is frozen, the prospect of changing habits or 
dispositions is closed (it need not be believed to be closed, but it must be in fact closed). 
Thus, the belief-freezing pill perfectly satisfies the aim of fixing belief, and so counts as 
legitimate on Peirce’s explicit account. Misak points out, however, that the belief-freezing 
pill method fails her legitimacy criterion. If such a pill were administered, the resulting 
state of mind of the pill-taker would not be, strictly speaking, a state of belief (in Misak’s 
sense). Reliance upon the notion of evidence, however, makes Misak’s own account as 
vulnerable as the account she hopes to fortify. The “open-inquiry” criterion introduced 
here, however, gives the same result as Misak’s account without falling subject to the same 
pitfalls. This method fails legitimacy, on my account, because it forever closes off the 
possibility of future inquiry. Once the pill has been swallowed, no issues may ever arise as 
the subject of inquiry. Thus this method is specious for it fails to leave the path to inquiry 
open. 
6. The Path of Greatest Resistance 
Inquiry is instigated, on Peirce’s view, only by doubt. So keeping the path of 
inquiry open requires keeping susceptible to doubt the field of one’s belief set that is 
 
 
McLaughlin – In Pursuit of Resistance  (DRAFT – Please do not cite or quote) 
 
 
12
relevant to the inquiry. This does not require that one be in a state of constant doubt, but 
rather it requires vigilance in detecting and pursuing possible sources of doubt. Peirce’s 
recurring suggestions that doubt is an “irritation” and that it is “unsettling” might incline 
one to seek its permanent removal.11 Peirce agrees that the removal of doubt is a worthy 
pursuit, but he is careful to be explicit about how this goal is to be pursued. His system is 
predicated on fallibilism, the view that nothing is entirely certain, but nevertheless he 
believes that progress is possible. Indeed progress is ensured by continual probing and 
inquiry. 
The best method of inquiry is the scientific method, which is characterized by 
taking reality as its object. According to Peirce, the real is “that whose characters are 
independent of what anybody may think them to be” (5.405). One particularly novel 
element of Peirce’s approach is that on his view the real is encountered in experience as 
opposition. He tells us that our conception of the real “is a conception which we must first 
have had when we discovered that there was an unreal, an illusion; that is, when we first 
corrected ourselves” (5.311) As Thomas Olshewsky puts it, “[t]he only sense in which we 
know [a dynamical object] is negatively: when our actions and experiences are not 
habituated to conform to its habits, we confront it in unanticipated surprise” (1994, 28). 
When we form a belief about some matter, we do so with an expectation that the belief will 
serve us well in the future. This means, at least, that we develop the belief with an eye 
toward avoiding surprises. As long as our expectations are not thwarted we expect that our 
beliefs are fully adequate. This conformity with expectations, however, is no guarantee that 
our beliefs perfectly conform with reality. Even though nothing prevents our knowing 
objects as they really are, “we can never be absolutely certain of [knowing outward things 
                                                 
11 See 5.373-375, 5.394, 7.317. 
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as they really are] in any special case” (5.311). Olshewsky summarizes this aspect of 
Peirce’s system as follows: “Phenomenologically, reality must be understood as 
opposition, and phenomenologically is the only way that we can understand reality” (1994, 
28-29). Reality is manifest as opposition since this is the way in which it is primarily 
encountered. This is not to say that we only encounter reality in this way. Of course we 
make our way in the world and this means that we do somehow plot a course with and 
through reality; but it is only when the course takes an unexpected turn that reality as 
independent (of our conceptions and expectations of it) makes itself known. 
Inquiry properly conducted just is inquiry toward truth, toward conforming one’s 
conceptions to reality. Insofar as we pursue this in earnest, we seek ways of comparing 
hypotheses to reality (testing hypotheses) and assessing the results.12 Since we encounter 
reality primarily as opposition, comparing hypotheses to reality requires that we maximize 
opposition.13 The most fruitful testing, then, will come in the form of negative tests, where 
we deliberately seek out circumstances that would undermine the hypothesis. If the 
hypothesis stands up to this sort of scrutiny, then our confidence in its future success is 
substantially and legitimately boosted. The best way to ensure against the resurgence of 
doubt is to take care that in conducting inquiry we accommodate as far as possible those 
scenarios that could otherwise become obstacles and thus doubt-producing circumstances. 
Subject the hypothesis under scrutiny to the most rigorous of tests; if it passes these then 
the subsequent emergence of doubt-prompting circumstances becomes less likely.14 Thus 
                                                 
12 Peirce makes some recommendations for how hypothesis testing should proceed, based on considerations 
of economy. Peirce’s work on the economy of research is explored below. 
13 For a nice discussion of this issue, see (Olshewsky 1994). 
14 Deborah Mayo agrees that the severity of the tests a hypothesis passes is indicative of the degree to which 
the hypothesis is to be believed. She also characterizes Peirce’s view of induction in similar terms. For her 
characterization, see section 12.2 of (Mayo 1996). 
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the optimal path for scientific inquiry is the path of greatest resistance – seeking out 
potential obstacles, facing and accommodating those that arise, thereby enriching and 
fortifying our conceptions about the world. 
7. Economy of Research 
In practice, we cannot pursue all obstacles. Actual scientific inquiry is constrained 
by limited resources. Peirce refers explicitly to limitations in “money, time, energy, and 
thought” (7.220). Of course there may be other costs to doing research, such as risks 
incurred to one’s professional reputation by pursuit of an unpopular research program. All 
of these factors, physical, personal, and social, are weighed by scientists in determining 
how to conduct their research. Which hypotheses to pursue and how best to pursue them is 
dictated by considerations about economy, involving cost/benefit analysis. Peirce was well 
aware of the need to economize in scientific investigation, and of the need to develop 
appropriate standards by which economy might be achieved. He writes: 
Research must contrive to do business at a profit; . . . it must produce more 
effective scientific energy than it expends. No doubt, it already does so. 
But it would do well to become conscious of its economical position and 
contrive ways of living upon it. (7.159) 
Much has been written about Peirce’s discussions of abduction and the extent to 
which appropriate guidelines can inform the process of hypothesis formulation. Kronz & 
McLaughlin (2005) notes that Peirce’s work can contribute usefully to our understanding 
of how to set research priorities in the evidence-gathering phase. There, Kronz and 
McLaughlin address at length some of Peirce’s specific recommendations for how to 
economically conduct scientific research in order to yield the most valuable information. 
Their discussion focuses on formally articulating the “Peircean Test Condition” as a 
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supplement to Achinstein’s theory of evidence. In what follows, I summarize some of the 
findings in Kronz & McLaughlin (2005), but put those findings to substantially different 
use. I argue that Peirce’s specific recommendations can be understood in light of his 
general epistemology and its implication that optimizing inquiry requires maximizing 
opposition. In particular, I argue that Peirce’s strongest recommendations for how to go 
about economically amassing evidence are best understood as instantiations of the general 
recommendation to follow the path of greatest resistance. 
For the purposes of the following discussion, we can think of evidence gathering as 
involving two broad phases: narrowing the field of viable hypotheses, and determining 
which experimental results to test for. Peirce’s work offers useful guidelines for navigating 
each of these phases, which I discuss below. While these phases are treated separately, 
such treatment does not imply that the phases are either exclusive or sequential. Their 
separation here is conceptual, and serves only as a convenient device for discussion.  
8. Narrowing the Field of Hypotheses 
Nicholas Rescher has discussed Peirce’s work on economy of research, and notes 
that Peirce gives priority, on economic grounds, to two sorts of hypotheses.15 The simpler 
among available hypotheses, Peirce claims, as have many others, are more economical. 
Simple hypotheses are operationally cheaper, since they will involve fewer variables to 
accommodate in experimentation and are likely to have more obvious and easily calculable 
application. Peirce also gives priority to hypotheses with high generality relative to cost. 
The more general the hypothesis, as Karl Popper noted, the more it will imply. Rescher 
carefully points out that Peirce also recommends preference for generality, but that he 
                                                 
15 See chapter 4 of (Rescher 1978). 
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balances generality against the costs of investigating those implications (1978, 83). These 
general recommendations, however, can serve only as general guides. Simplicity is a 
notoriously difficult concept to explicate with any degree of rigor, and generality relative 
to cost is not particularly useful without measures of generality and cost as well as some 
method for weighing them against one another. Fortunately, Peirce has much more specific 
suggestions, which can be applied without the addition of a great deal of conceptual 
baggage. 
Presumably, the strongest among available hypotheses are the ones that deserve 
scientists’ initial attention. Peirce would agree, but as Rescher, and Kronz and McLaughlin 
note, Peirce does not consider the strength of a hypothesis to consist merely in its 
likelihood.16 Instead, the strength or ‘urgency’ of a hypothesis is measured in terms of the 
resources that scientists would be willing to commit to its examination (2.780). That Peirce 
conceives thusly of the strength of hypotheses helps to explain why he gives precedence to 
hypotheses whose examination involves “very little expense of any kind” (7.220). 
Hypotheses that can be tested very inexpensively will be among the strongest. Kronz and 
McLaughlin point out that Peirce assigns priority to cheaply tested hypotheses not only 
because refutable hypotheses might be eliminated, but also because hypotheses that are 
contrary to existing presuppositions might be supported (2005, 73). Here is the first point 
where the implications of Peirce’s general theory of inquiry, that we should seek the path 
of greatest resistance, dovetail with his specific research recommendations. In suggesting 
that we begin not with those hypotheses that seem most likely, given what we already 
understand, but those that are “greatly at variance with preconceived ideas”, Peirce invokes 
                                                 
16 (Rescher 1978, 69, n105, n108), (Kronz and McLaughlin 2005, 74). 
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resistance (7.83). The pragmatic value of this suggestion is clear, since finding support for 
hypotheses that undermine current views could bear significant scientific fruit. 
Supposing we take this initial suggestion seriously, we will begin to narrow the 
field of viable hypotheses by first determining which hypotheses we can test very cheaply. 
Some of these will be refuted and others will be supported by the ensuing evidence. As the 
testing process continues, the urgency of supported hypotheses grows, since the more 
support amassed for a hypothesis, the more confidence scientists will have in it, and thus 
the more resources they will be willing to commit to it. During the testing process, though, 
the question of which hypotheses deserve priority is not the only relevant question. For any 
sufficiently general hypothesis, there will be a number of experimental results that might 
be tested for. The next section addresses other of Peirce’s suggestions, specifically about 
how to choose among the particular tests that might be performed. 
9. Determining which Experimental Results to Test for 
Peirce requires that any hypothesis, in order to count as scientific, must conform 
with the pragmatic maxim, the distinguishing feature of which is its implication that the 
meaning of any hypothesis consists entirely in its practical consequences. The question 
with which we are concerned here is which of those practical consequences is most 
economical to pursue. That is, we want to determine which empirical tests are likely to 
yield the best information for the costs. Kronz & McLaughlin (2005) presents a formal 
expression of Peirce’s recommendations for how to determine which empirical tests to 
perform. The recommendation is founded on Peirce’s claim that we should “begin with 
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that positive prediction . . . which seems least likely to be verified” (7.206).17 Kronz and 
McLaughlin argue that a particular way of understanding Peirce’s pragmatic maxim helps 
us to see what should ground our probabilistic determination of the likelihood of a 
prediction’s being verified. The upshot of the argument is that determining which of a 
hypothesis’ predictions is least likely to be verified requires having in hand an alternative 
hypothesis, according to which the probabilistic assessment is to be made. It is worth 
taking some time to go through their argument here, since the recommendation they 
articulate serves to support my interpretation of Peirce’s views on economy of research as 
instances of the general recommendation to pursue resistance. 
Kronz and McLaughlin show that by the ‘least likely to be verified’ prediction, 
Peirce means that prediction that “appear[s] otherwise least likely to be true” (7.89). 
Understanding what would allow us to assess the likelihood of truth, here, requires 
understanding what Peirce means by ‘otherwise’. Kronz and McLaughlin consider three 
possible senses, arguing in favor of the last of the three. First, ‘otherwise’ could mean 
“upon regarding the hypothesis as false” (2005, 76). Second, it could mean “upon omitting 
consideration of (i.e., upon conceptually setting aside) the hypothesis in question” (2005, 
76). Third, it could mean assuming a contrary, competing hypothesis (2005, 77). Kronz 
and McLaughlin argue that only the third sense of ‘otherwise’ provides a suitable basis 
                                                 
17 Peirce writes that “it will be a saving of expense, to begin with that positive prediction from the hypothesis 
which seems least likely to be verified.” While this sentence, as is, suggests that it is the hypothesis “least 
likely to be verified” with which one should begin, the rest of the paragraph makes clear that Peirce means 
the prediction, not the hypothesis. The full paragraph, without elision, follows: 
Experiment is very expensive business, in money, in time, and in thought; so that it will 
be a saving of expense, to begin with that positive prediction from the hypothesis which 
seems least likely to be verified. For a single experiment may absolutely refute the most 
valuable of hypotheses, while a hypothesis must be a trifling one indeed if a single 
experiment could establish it. When, however, we find that prediction after prediction, 
notwithstanding a preference for putting the most unlikely ones to the test, is verified by 
experiment, whether without modification or with a merely quantitative modification, we 
begin to accord to the hypothesis a standing among scientific results. (7.206) 
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upon which to make probabilistic assessments, provided that the hypothesis in question is 
suitably broad. An example will help to illustrate the point. 
Consider the hypothesis that magnesium assists in muscle repair. From this, we 
might derive a prediction about the presence of magnesium in an animal’s diet being 
positively correlated with muscle repair. The likelihood that this prediction is true, given 
the denial of the hypothesis, is impossible to assess. Given the hypothesis’ denial, that it is 
not the case that magnesium assists in muscle repair, nothing in particular follows about 
how the presence of magnesium in an animal’s diet should correlate with muscle repair. If, 
instead, we simply disregard the hypothesis, we have no grounds upon which to assess the 
likelihood of the prediction. If we consider some alternative hypothesis, however, for 
instance that magnesium plays no role in muscle repair, then we have some basis upon 
which to judge whether or not the prediction seems likely. 
Kronz and McLaughlin argue that we should understand Peirce as recommending 
that scientists begin with those predictions of the hypothesis in question “that appear least 
likely to be true on the assumption of some competing, contrary hypothesis—the one that 
would be superseded if [the hypothesis in question] were confirmed” (2005, 77). Not only 
does this recommendation prove practically feasible, it is founded, Kronz and McLaughlin 
argue, on Peirce’s pragmatic maxim. They point to a relatively late formulation of the 
maxim where Peirce highlights concerns not merely about hypotheses on their own, but 
about how they compare with other, competing hypotheses. There Peirce construes the 
pragmatic maxim as a measure of significant difference between conceptions, and thereby 
suggests that the significance of a hypothesis is best elucidated by comparison with other 
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hypotheses.18 If the hypotheses have precisely the same practical consequences, then they 
are really the same hypothesis. If the practical consequences differ, then the hypotheses 
differ. 
Taking Kronz and McLaughlin’s understanding of Peirce’s recommendation, then, 
we should begin by determining which predictions of a hypothesis have the lowest 
probability, given a suitable, contrary hypothesis. Once we have the least likely predictions 
in hand, we use other economic factors to determine whether to perform the tests. If the 
least likely prediction is economically prohibitive, then we look for the least likely among 
the remaining predictions and assess the economic feasibility of testing for it. Not only 
does this characterization give us practical guidance for how to gather evidence, it also 
accommodates a wide range of context-sensitive issues. Since the economic feasibility of 
performing any particular test—including political, professional, social, and personal 
factors in addition to concerns about equipment, funding, human power, and time—can 
vary quite a lot dependent on context, so may the recommendations about which tests to 
perform. In addition, as Kronz and McLaughlin point out, even though their analysis of 
Peirce’s recommendation is more or less confined to the case of one hypothesis under 
consideration, the recommendation can be generalized to accommodate any number of 
hypotheses that might populate the field. 
10. Pursuing Paths of Resistance 
While the foregoing recommendations are fairly specific to research contexts and 
are clearly intended to accommodate the constraints that such contexts impose, there are 
                                                 
18 The significant passage referred to in (Kronz and McLaughlin 2005) appears at 5.196. Others, both before 
and after Peirce, have made similar suggestions. Paul Feyerabend argues that consideration of contrary 
hypotheses is necessary for understanding a hypothesis (Feyerabend 1981). John Stuart Mill made a similar 
suggestion in On Liberty. 
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ways in which Peirce’s general epistemological commitments are at work in these specific 
recommendations. In the first half of this paper, I argued that Peirce’s theory of inquiry is 
best understood as dictating that we inquire in ways that leave open the path to future 
inquiry. For a method to count, on Peirce’s view, as a method of inquiry it must 
accomplish the goal of inquiry, and so end in settling (to some degree) our beliefs about 
the matter at hand. In order to count as legitimate methods of inquiry, however, they must 
accomplish that end in a way that does not presume that the beliefs upon which we have 
settled are the final word on the matter. If we follow Peirce in this, we require of ourselves 
a constant striving, believing just what we believe, but never resting content with it. This is 
the attitude of the consummate scientist, accepting the best of the theories available, but 
never dogmatically, and always on alert for the shortcomings of those views and the 
possibility that other, better theories may be on the horizon. 
Since science, broadly construed, serves as a model of inquiry for Peirce, we 
should not be surprised that the model scientist is also a model Peircean inquirer. What 
might be surprising, however, is the way in which realism asserts itself in Peirce’s views 
about science and inquiry. Peirce’s clear (later) commitments to realism seem prima facie 
at odds with his representationism, based on his claim that all thought is in signs. These 
two commitments are more clearly coherent, however, when one notes the roles that Peirce 
assigns reality in his system, especially his claim that reality manifests primarily as 
opposition. This claim, coupled with Peirce’s conviction that truth takes reality as its 
object, leads to the view that inquiry is best when it maximizes opposition. The more one 
seeks out sources of resistance to one’s beliefs, the more one sets those beliefs up for 
contact with reality. 
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There are at least three ways that resistance is involved in the foregoing treatment 
of Peirce’s recommendations for gathering evidence: in the preference for experiments that 
(economically) test hypotheses “greatly at variance” with current beliefs, in requiring 
consideration of contrary hypotheses for determining the least likely predictions, and in 
preferring those least likely predictions in the first place. While the optimal path of 
scientific inquiry would be the path of greatest resistance, limited resources thwart our 
pursuit of that path. Peirce’s recommendations, though, can be understood as allowing us 
to nevertheless pursue paths of resistance, and indeed of contriving ways to maximize 
resistance within the practical constraints that must govern our inquiries. 
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